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Preamble 
There is some uncertainty written into the form of this paper because, while it seeks 
to use scholarly procedures in engaging with the philosophical questions provoked 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late speculative essay On Certainty,1 it arose out of my re-
search toward a theatrical interpretation of that work. The article is an attempt to 
stage the mode of thought, as well as the state of mind, of this most complex thinker 
in his last years. My thoughts pay particular attention to philosophical traditions, 
while considering dramatic forms, spatial meanings, constellations of persons, histo-
ries, ideas, events, and designs. 
 Moreover, I am locating the text in the context of the workshop, ‘Missing and 
Missed: The Subject, Politics and Memorialisation of South Africa’s Colonial and 
Apartheid Dead’ at which it was presented in early 2018. The workshop generated 
papers and conversations enquiring into the grief, abjection, rage, and discourage-
ment that have marked so much of the violent histories of the twentieth and twenty- 
first centuries, and their legacies of colonialism, genocide, and geographic disloca-
tion. The anguish of these materials requires a certain gravitas, and there might seem 
some waywardness in my exploring the arcane philosophical thought of a young man 
born into staggering wealth and privilege in Europe at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Wittgenstein made a compelling and genuinely 
traumatised attempt to use intellectual means to come to terms with the precarious-
ness and uncertainty of life in the twentieth century. The depth of his enquiry is read 
in the following pages alongside some of the details of his ‘family romance’.2 
 I am aware that Wittgenstein’s writings have been grouped into two distinct 
modes: his early work is conceived within the frame of picture theory, and his later 
writings seek to interpret the world in terms of language games. In both, his thought 
marked him as an outsider to his own traditions. On thinking about the ‘Missing and 
Missed’, I was prompted to reconsider his rather uncanny meditations, his sense of 
the enigmatic, and magical thinking. How might these have arisen from within the 
1 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 1969, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. Wright (eds), Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).
2 I mean ‘family romance’ in the Freudian sense, to allude to the psychic drama of the unfolding of the self inside the nuclear 
family. Wittgenstein’s complex relation to Freud is well documented. On one hand, he was a keen advocate of his Viennese 
compatriot. This did not prevent him from levelling a clear critique at the Freudian method at times. A striking instance of 
this can be found in a posthumous collection of his letters, essays and reflections, Culture and Value, G. H. Von Wright (ed.), 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Wittgenstein writes, ‘What is intriguing about a dream is not its causal connection 
with events in my life, etc., but rather the impression it gives of being a fragment of a story … the rest of which remains obscure’ 
(p. 68e). Here the typical Wittgensteinian appeal to obscurity is linked to fragmentation. This is significant as an insight into ideas 
I am exploring around the haunting of that which is ‘missing’ in Wittgenstein’s thought and experience. 
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philosophy and within his life? Here, I invoke his observations about how we inhabit 
presence and absence within representation and language.
 While not seeking to engage in a ‘Wittgensteinian reading’ (were such a thing 
were possible), nor undertaking a biographical reading of the philosopher,3 I am 
trying to imagine what skeins of interpretation and suggestion might be integral to 
a process of staging Wittgenstein’s thought, although not wholly on its own terms. 
Recent dramatic theory has suggested that the uncanny is necessarily the effect inside 
one’s experience of a dramatic performance, because everything within the theatrical 
arts has an explicit doubling. Things and persons are simultaneously themselves and 
a something else. A desk might stand for a policeman’s office while it is onstage, yet 
it may also recognisably be the desk used at a local high school. Moreover there is 
a complex temporality onstage, which conjures an exquisite presence and absence,4 
in that every event is based on the actors’ ‘taking for granted’ that everything will, 
tomorrow at this point in the action, be exactly the same.5 That event will mimic this 
one; and yet, each time it is performed, it is unique to itself – with all of the codes 
and conventions of cause and effect known, and yet ‘as if for the first time’. This is 
not bad faith; rather it has come to be referred to as ‘the suspension of disbelief ’, and 
I am inclined to consider Wittgenstein’s thoughts about ‘certainty’ as operating in a 
similar mode. 
 Questions about creativity and scholarly service have implications for research 
and for interpretation. I am interested intellectually in putting some pressure on both 
modes. At some level, I am asking a Janus-faced question that looks in two directions 
at once: to what extent is creative exploration of a historical figure legitimate (even 
necessary) in attempts to apprehend the person and the experience of that figure; and 
in what ways is the archive a constraint on the creative purposes of the interpreter? 
(The Wittgenstein archive includes a very diverse body of writings: an extensive biog-
raphy; secondhand interpretations that amount, at times, to hagiography; profound 
philosophical debate within linguistics and philosophy; a cinematic poem;6 and a 
film7). Put differently, my question is, how do scholarly and creative endeavours agi-
tate one another, and what is the potential gain from this? 
 Wittgenstein’s writing is notoriously complex and difficult to apprehend. I am 
not considering his entire oeuvre. My intentions are very circumscribed. I am seek-
ing to draw some meaning from one of his last papers in order to make a theatre 
work that might illuminate some spheres within his writing. While I am thinking 
with and about Wittgenstein’s essay, this paper is not a script for that theatrical piece. 
Rather, this is some of the background research towards the making of that work. 
3 There are several such. I recommend two in particular: R. Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London: Vintage, 1991) and 
Alexander Waugh, The House of Wittgenstein: A Family at War (New York: Anchor, 2009).
4 Freddie Rokem, Samuel Weber, and Marvin Carlson have all written on various aspects of these questions.
5 In the past several decades, this convention of iterability has been challenged by performance art, which sets itself apart from 
acting largely around the conception that each performance is a one-off; the classic text on this question is still, R. Goldberg, 
Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present, 3rd ed. (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2011).
6 This fascinating 1992 response to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus by Péter Forgács, is available on YouTube.
7 The credits for the 1993 film Wittgenstein give an indication of how much is at stake in any engagement with Wittgenstein: the 
film was directed by Derek Jarman, scripted by Jarman, Terry Eagleton and Ken Butler, and produced by Tariq Ali.
183 http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-9585/2018/v44a11 Kronos 44
That is, in this paper, I consider the relationship between research and the varieties 
of interpretation. The proofs, arguments or evidence I have selected are of a particu-
lar mode. They make available a kind of argument arising from the conjunction of 
Wittgenstein’s own psychosexual being with the geopolitical context of his lifeworld 
and the decidedly individual (if not eccentric) mode of his writing. These consider-
ations are both methodological and theoretical. I am also exploring how ideas can 
provide the substance of what happens onstage in a performance event.8 
 There are several ways of knowing and of representation, the varieties of which 
arise most productively, it seems to me, through interpretations that lie on a cusp 
between the scholarly and the creative. This may be because the archive is inevitably 
fragmentary or inadequately tested. In postcolonial studies, that archive is substan-
tially asymmetrical, with an obvious bias toward written records. This frequently re-
sults in the detailed presence of the colonial voice, and only a conjectural presence of 
the colonised, who may (at best) be figured through the ventriloquisms of colonial 
administrators or ethnographic observers. In such cases, what amounts to a ‘counter-
historical’ set of hermeneutic procedures becomes fruitful. This is where I am inter-
ested in what the arts make available, supplementing what is missing in an informed 
and substantial way. 
 Wittgenstein wrote notes for the essay On Certainty shortly before his death. 
What strikes me as provocative and generative about them are the ways in which 
the philosopher posits that our assurances of the world are sustained more through 
that which we do not examine than that which we test. Some resonance between this 
and an Althusserian understanding of ideology seems to occur, although it is hard to 
imagine a more incongruous pairing of thinkers.9 
 As one of the richest families in Europe at the start of the twentieth century, the 
Wittgensteins provide a narrative of catastrophe that is somehow symptomatic of 
an era. 
I:  On the one hand
It is World War I. Three brothers are engaged on the Eastern Front. The young men 
are not fighting side by side, as one might imagine. Rather, each of them is, we may 
say, in a different battle zone, each in his own war, though they are all fighting on the 
side of the Habsburgs. Sons of one of the richest houses of Vienna, their saga becomes 
significant for history because the youngest of the three is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who 
becomes one of the twentieth century’s most influential philosophers. 
8 Here, I am aware that I am straying into complex terrain, already very thoughtfully considered by D. LaCapra. In ‘Review: 
Reading Exemplars: Wittgenstein’s Vienna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, Diacritics, 9, 2, Summer 1979, 65–82, LaCapra analyses 
questions that arise through two discrepant readings of Wittgenstein. One is grounded in a close reading of the philosopher’s 
own puzzling and occasionally luminous thinking – often marked by enigmas; the other is a bio-political reading of Wittgenstein 
as he might be ‘understood’ through his relationship to fin-de-siècle Vienna. LaCapra’s point is that the courage of the philosophy 
in the Tractatus is that it stands as a testimony to contradictions and unresolved questioning, while Allan Janik and Stephen 
Toulmin’s book, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, seems to resolve and explain these issues by locating them within his milieu. 
9 It is perhaps no more than a curious accident that the two works were written within a year of one another. For Althusser, this 
would constitute a political question, while for Wittgenstein it would be a philosophical one, although each would no doubt 
(‘certainly’) have an apparatus for interpreting one another’s instruments. 
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 Here, I give a brief account of the three brothers, and their encounters with 
the war.
 Let me begin with the eldest of the three. In October 1918, just weeks before the 
war ended, Kurt shot and killed himself after the soldiers under his command refused 
to obey his orders. It seems that his troops, who were largely made up of Czechs, 
Poles, Croats and Hungarians, no longer saw themselves as members of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and instead had begun to identify with the emerging fragmentary 
states that had already been given autonomy by the emperor. Disinclined to fight for 
the Habsburgs any longer, the soldiers began to wander off towards their homelands, 
abandoning Kurt and their station, as the imperial state began to disintegrate.
 Suicide was the route of least humiliation for their commanding officer.10 Such 
was Kurt’s fate. He was also the third of Ludwig’s brothers to commit suicide; two 
others had died some years before, while Ludwig was just a boy.
 The second brother on the Eastern Front is Paul. His story raises many questions 
of theatrical interest for me, and several of my performance questions arise from his 
story. Paul was conscripted early in the war, and, in August 1914, during the Austrian 
assault on Poland, he was captured by Russian troops. In the skirmish, he was shot 
in the right arm, and lost consciousness. On coming round, he discovered that his 
arm had been amputated. This would be a grim catastrophe for any of us, but for Paul 
Wittgenstein, it was distinctly so because he was a concert pianist of some ambition. 
 His musical ambition was surely part of the family burden. The Wittgensteins 
were all distinctly oriented toward music: the household had seven grand pianos; 
Hans, the first-born son, and the first to commit suicide, had been considered a musi-
cal prodigy; Ludwig could whistle entire movements from several well-known sym-
phonies; Brahms, Mahler, and Richard Strauss were only the most famous of the 
many musicians to regularly visit the Wittgenstein household; and musical criticism 
was part of the family ethos. Paul is reported as having wailed at Ludwig, ‘I cannot 
play the piano when you are in the house as I feel your skepticism seeping towards 
me from under the door.’11 
 Music is surely a major element of the staging of the piece.
 The wounded, one-armed Paul was imprisoned for some time in the dread 
Siberian fortress where Dostoyevsky set his novel, The House of the Dead, and here he 
had to begin to reckon with the fact of his missing limb. It must have been a kind of 
therapeutic mania that drove him to set himself the task of re-arranging conventional 
piano pieces for the left hand, using a makeshift drawing of a keyboard on a crate to 
think through the placement of fingers on notes. On this ‘virtual’ piano, he perfected 
complex fingering, using only his left hand to create the aural illusion of two-handed 
10 Various interpretations of the motivations for Kurt’s death are outlined in Waugh’s House of Wittgenstein. Monk’s biography notes 
simply that Kurt ‘shot himself when the troops under his command had refused to obey orders.’ Duty of Genius, 11. His footnotes 
do not indicate his source. This account is one that strikes me as compelling. 
11 These biographical elements are largely derived from Monk, Duty of Genius. The considerations about Paul Wittgenstein are 
informed, too, by B. Howe, ‘Wittgenstein and the Performance of Disability,’ Journal of Musicology 27, 2, Spring 2010, 135–180; 
and J. O’Rourke, ‘Paul Wittgenstein: The One-Armed Piano Maestro of WWI,’ BBC Arts, 5 November 2014. 
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playing. Paul engaged in this drill for up to seven hours a day, and in this process he 
began to arrange Chopin’s Revolutionary Étude for the left hand.12 
 Paul Wittgenstein’s transcription of the Chopin work may well have been influ-
enced by the fact that Leopold Godowsky had set several arrangements of Chopin’s 
etudes for the left hand. Godowsky is cited as among the greatest classical pianists 
in history; it is likely that his left-handed transcriptions were composed in part just 
because he could play them, and they served as a kind of technical challenge for 
him. His arrangements are renowned for their technical difficulty and have been 
called the most impossibly difficult things ever written for the piano.13 According 
to some, ‘Godowsky was probably unequalled in independence of hands, equality 
of finger, and his ability to delineate polyphonic strands’ while fellow virtuoso pia-
nist and composer Vladimir Horowitz apparently claimed that six hands are needed 
to play his Passacaglia.14 Although some recordings exist, very few people ever saw 
Godowsky play – he could not bear performing in public.
 There is some suggestion that Paul Wittgenstein would have known of Godowsky’s 
arrangements, and that they spurred him to arrange his own version of Chopin’s 
Revolutionary Étude. Of course, the textures of war, so brilliantly evoked by Chopin, 
may also have influenced this choice. Chopin’s work is a distraught aural response 
to Poland’s failed November Uprising against Russia in 1830 and 1831, and is likely 
to have had emotional magnitude for a young man who had lost an arm fighting on 
the Russian Front. Chopin dedicated the piece to his friend Franz Liszt, who (inter-
estingly) had trained the gifted left-handed pianist Géza Zichy. Zichy lost a hand in 
a shooting accident as a youth.15 The work would have resonated with Paul for any 
number of reasons.
 The reader might watch a fragment of this astonishing work, which was com-
posed as Chopin’s meditation on the bombardment of Warsaw. Its performance 
makes us attentive to what the left hand is doing in the playing of the piece. Some 
performances of the Godowsky left-handed arrangement are available on YouTube, 
and they are striking to watch and hear by comparison.16
II:  Philosophy’s response; and psychology’s too
Let me turn now to the youngest of the three brothers, the philosopher Ludwig. 
Before the war, from 1911, Ludwig had been in Cambridge, studying philosophy 
with Bertrand Russell. When the war broke out in July 1914, Ludwig was with his 
family in Austria, and tried to leave for Norway. On being prevented from doing 
12 Howe, ‘Wittgenstein and the Performance of Disability’; O’Rourke, ‘Paul Wittgenstein’.
13 See ‘Leopold Godowsky Left Hand: Chopin Études and Other Pieces for the Left Hand Alone’, n.d., https://www.forte-piano-
pianissimo.com/Godowsky-Left-Hand.html (accessed 26 June 2018).
14 ThePiano.SG, ‘Introduction to Leopold Godowsky, his 53 Studies on Chopin’s Études, and Passacaglia’, n.d., https://www.
thepiano.sg/piano/read/introduction-leopold-godowsky-his-53-studies-chopins-etudes-and-passacaglia (accessed 26 June 
2018). 
15 E. Blom (ed.), Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Vol IX 5th ed. (Oxford: Macmillan,1954), 414. According to Waugh, 
Zichy was an acquaintance of Paul’s; Waugh, House of Wittgenstein. 
16 I am in the first phase of a conversation with Johannesburg pianist Jill Richards, who is passionate about experimental piano 
performance, and has some familiarity with the left-handed repertoire. 
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so, he volunteered for civilian duties, and by August, he had signed up for military 
service in the Austro-Hungarian army. Back in Cambridge, Russell, who was an ear-
nest pacifist, opposed conscription. Following his conviction for pacifism under the 
Defence of the Realm Act of 1914, Russell was dismissed from the university and sent 
to prison for the rest of the war, and later described these experiences in 1922 in his 
Free Thought and Official Propaganda. It was surely something of a puzzle for Russell 
when Ludwig, his protégé and someone he admired with an almost total adoration, 
signed up to fight for Austria.
 While Ludwig was manning an anti-aircraft searchlight on a gunboat near Krakow, 
his diaries record that he was reading Nietzsche’s, The Anti-Christ. Promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant, Ludwig was sent to the Italian Front, where he was captured. He 
spent the end of the war as a prisoner, apparently writing notes for his early major 
work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – a work pretty well unlike anything else in the 
Western tradition. Wittgenstein’s writing is notoriously idiosyncratic, often more like 
poetry than philosophy. His work has disquieted generations of readers, largely be-
cause his enigmatic forms and unlikely idioms do not adhere to known philosophical 
procedures. Alain Badiou classified him as an anti-philosopher, along with Nietzsche, 
Lacan and St Paul.17
 Meanwhile, in England, Ludwig’s beloved companion, David Hume Pinsent had 
gone to Farnborough to train as a test pilot. In 1918, a biplane bomber he was flying 
spontaneously ripped into five pieces, killing Pinsent and his co-pilot. No trace of 
Pinsent’s body was ever recovered, despite a (presumably extensive) search by 1200 
soldiers that included the dragging of a canal. Wittgenstein was desolate at the death, 
and, three years later, dedicated his Tractatus to Pinsent.18
 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus swerves between contesting idioms to denote represen-
tation, activating the terms vorstellen, dastellen and abbilden in different instances. 
Wittgenstein also uses the term bedeuten (to mean, to stand for, to signify) for the 
ways in which a name refers to an object and for the way in which philosophy oblique-
ly indicates the unsayable.19 Wittgenstein’s work is irresistibly metaphysical in many of 
its guises.20 Wittgenstein also demonstrates a quite extraordinary apprehension of the 
complex ordering of worlds that are simultaneously active. He notes, for example, that 
‘the description of a wish is … the description of its fulfilment.’ This suggests that the 
material world and its representations are mutually ‘entangled’. Here I allude expressly 
to that term as invoked by the title of this special edition ‘Missing and Missed’. I also 
acknowledge that the concept of ‘entanglement’ emerged from within a philosophical 
tradition associated with quantum theory and the uncertainty principle. 
17 Alain Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Anti-Philosophy, Bruno Bosteels (trans.) (New York and London: Verso, 2011).
18 A detailed chronology is available at www.wittgensteinchronology.com.
19 LaCapra, ‘Reading Exemplars’, 76.
20 On the various guises of Wittgenstein’s writings:  only his  Tractatus  was published in his lifetime. His other impactful and 
significant writings are in letters, or in the celebrated ‘notebooks’ written up by scholars who attended his classes – a group who 
have, perhaps unfairly, been identified as disciples. The writings are not standard philosophy, but in the nature of epigram, such 
as Pascal wrote – leaving readers to ‘find’ a skein of thought across diffuse iterations collected at various times.
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In 1939, when the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore set out to refute real-world 
scepticism (that is, doubt about the substantial reality of a knowable material world), 
he held up his one hand while asserting the premise that: ‘Here is a hand’. He then 
raised his other hand stating, ‘and here is another’. With this demonstration, he be-
lieved himself to have shown that the world is not mind-dependent.21 Over several 
years, Wittgenstein, also at Cambridge, had engaged in fierce discussion with Moore 
– who was a long-standing interlocutor  – although Wittgenstein’s comments on 
Moore might suggest that they were antagonists in an archaic agon. For example, 
Wittgenstein said of Moore, ‘he shows you how far a man can go who has absolutely 
no intelligence whatsoever.’22 I suspect this was a measure of Wittgenstein’s regard – 
Moore was so close to Wittgenstein in his question, that Wittgenstein could not bear 
that they were so far apart in method.23
 Moore’s well-known observations on the hand were clearly in Wittgenstein’s mind 
when, late in his career, he wrote his last work, On Certainty. As if in direct response, 
Wittgenstein’s essay begins, ‘If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all 
the rest.’24 Which he then qualifies with the enigmatic ‘From its seeming to me – or 
to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.’ For Wittgenstein ‘seeming’ and 
‘knowing’ are different orders of thought. In his terms, ‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ 
belong to different categories.25
 This speculative reasoning opens the way for profound instability about verifi-
able fact, in terms such as had been posited in physics by the uncertainty principle. 
What is more, the emerging practice of prosthetics, which became well-established 
as a result of the ghastly injuries of World War II, began to alter the stock Cartesian 
assurances about the threshold of the physical self. Sigmund Freud developed the 
prosthesis into a figure that could act as a support for an idealisation of a fragmented 
self. 
Long ago [man] formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omni-
science which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed every-
thing that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to him. 
One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. Today he has 
come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a god 
himself. Only, it is true, in the fashion in which ideals are usually attained 
according to the general judgment of humanity: not completely, in some 
respects not at all, in others only half way. Man has, as it were, become a 
kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly 
magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give 
21 This event is discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in ‘A Discussion Between Wittgenstein and Moore on 
Certainty’ (1939): From the Notes of Norman Malcolm’, Mind, 124, 493, January 2015, 73–84. See also, G. E. Moore, ‘Proof of an 
External World’, 1939, in G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, (London: Routledge, 2013).
22 Monk, Duty of Genius, 262.
23 For an overview of this encounter, see the entry, ‘George Edward Moore: d. From the Ontology of Cognition to Criteriology,’ in 
J. Fieser and B. Dowden (eds), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/moore/#SH2d (accessed 26 June 
2018). 
24 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 2e.
25 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §308.
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him much trouble at times … Future ages will bring with them new and 
probably unimaginably great achievements in this field of civilization and 
will increase man’s likeness to God still more. But in the interests of our 
investigations, we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy 
in his Godlike character.26
 Freud is suggesting that the human subject has found the means through which 
to strap on psychical prostheses that can console her for perceived lacks, to mask or 
erase that which is missing. This is an abstract elaboration of an idea that Freud had 
been considering since the last years of World War I. 
We are not in the habit of devoting much thought to the fact that every 
night human beings lay aside the wrappings in which they have enveloped 
their skin, as well as anything which they may use as a supplement to their 
bodily organs (so far as they have succeeded in making good those organs’ 
deficiencies by substitutes), for instance, their spectacles, their false hair, 
and teeth and so on.27
 The horizons of personhood are, by convention and common-sense experience, 
associated with the skin, which is its threshold. Of course, that assertion understates 
the force of sensory information that penetrates us, in an endless riot of aural, vi-
sual, and olfactory information, and sensory thrills or revulsions from outside, which 
strike us to the core. 
Freud’s theory was profoundly influenced by his proximity to the war and its wound-
ed. In Part II of his influential essay, Beyond the Pleasure Principle,28 he describes what 
he calls, ‘traumatic neurosis’, which he identifies as arising from sudden disaster, such 
as a railway accident, or the terrible war, which had just ended. He was seeking to in-
terpret the increasingly prevalent phenomenon that has subsequently been identified 
as ‘shell shock’, noting ‘that the same symptoms sometimes came about without the 
intervention of any gross mechanical force.’29 In other words, a subject might experi-
ence the trauma of a disabling physical catastrophe without any manifest physical 
wound or disability. One might in such cases suggest that even the ‘originating epi-
sode’ is missing. 
 The first are images of early facial prostheses from World War I (Figures 1 & 2) 
used to conceal shattered bone and flesh; the second is an image (Figure 3) of the oral 
prostheses that Freud had to wear, once cancer had begun eating away the inside of 
his mouth. Only his daughter Anna was allowed to help him with the grim task of 
managing these.
26 S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 1929/1930 (New York: Norton, 1961), 39.
27 S. Freud, ‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’ (1917), 25.
28 S. Freud, and C. J. M. Hubbac, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (London: International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922).
29 S. Freud, On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, James Strachey (ed. and trans.), Pelican Freud Library, Volume 11 
(London: Penguin, 1984), 281.
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Figure 1
Figure 2
Figures 1 and 2: Prostheses made to conceal shattered bone and flesh associated with World 
War I injuries as seen in the exhibition, The Body Extended: Sculpture and Prosthetics at the 
Henry Moore Institute in Leeds (2016). Photograph by Jane Taylor. 
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Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is a curious work, in which the philosopher distinguishes 
between ‘facts’ we know, but that can and must be subjected to verification and test-
ing, and things of which we are certain. The certainties are such propositions for 
which the principle of testing makes no sense. As noted, the unsettling opening sen-
tence of this text is, ‘If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.’ 
He follows this up with, ‘§9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know 
that here is a hand – my own hand, that is?’ If any readers are prompted to read On 
Certainty, they will be astonished to discover how often the philosopher returns to 
the hand as his exemplary question: 
§23: If I don’t know whether someone has two hands (say, whether they 
have been amputated or not) I shall believe his assurance that he has two 
hands, if he is trustworthy.
§24: The idealist’s question would be something like: ‘What right have I not 
to doubt the existence of my hands?’
Figure 3: Collection of prostheses worn by Sigmund Freud after repeated surgeries for oral 
cancer had eroded large areas of his mouth, as seen in the exhibition, The Body Extended: 
Sculpture and Prosthetics at the Henry Moore Institute in Leeds (2016). Photograph by Jane 
Taylor. 
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§40: Upon ‘I know that here is my hand’ there may follow the question ‘How 
do you know?’ And the answer to that presupposes that this can be known 
in that way. So instead of ‘I know that here is my hand,’ one might say ‘Here 
is my hand’, and then add how one knows.
§41: ‘I know where I am feeling pain,’ ‘I know that I feel it here’ is as wrong 
as ‘I know that I am in pain.’ But ‘I know where you touched my arm’ is 
right. 
III:  Of loss
Wittgenstein’s early great love, David Hume Pinsent, was a descendant of the Scottish 
philosopher David Hume, after whom he was named. The philosopher Hume sug-
gested that there is only an internal claim to external reality, asking: ‘What causes 
induce us to believe in the existence of body?’ He also questioned, ‘why we attribute a 
continu’d existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses?’30
 These are very much the sort of questions addressed by Wittgenstein. Perhaps 
these Humean questions were discussed by the two men before David disappeared, 
literally without trace? 
After the war, Paul Wittgenstein, for whom ‘money was no object’, commissioned a 
spectrum of his era’s great composers to write works for the left-handed piano player. 
Korngold is the first; then Ravel, Prokofiev, Hindemith, Britten, and Strauss all re-
ceive commissions. Generally, Paul was unhappy with the compositions, and his dia-
logues with the composers were often fractious. Somehow it seems, the compositions 
revealed too much and not enough that the works were for a one-handed player. Here 
the significance of ‘passing’ is worth consideration. Paul Wittgenstein is in all likeli-
hood named after St Paul – the most famous converso in Western history, and one of 
Badiou’s anti-philosophers. 
What’s in a name? The grandfather, Hermann Christian Wittgenstein had converted 
from Judaism to Catholicism. One might be tempted to ask why their father, a man 
with Jewish ancestry whose family had assimilated through marriage into Viennese 
aristocracy, would manifest a conspicuous trace, in his son’s name. By naming his son 
Paul – after a Jew, who was also a Roman citizen, and who spent his early career as 
a persecutor of Christians but later became a patriarch of the Christian church – he 
seems to declare that his family is ‘passing’.
 Chapter 9 of the Book of Acts in the New Testament provides an account of Saul’s 
conversion. He is on the road to Damascus when he is thrown to the ground by a 
burst of sunlight, and a great voice demands to know, ‘Why persecutest thou me?’ 
30 D. Hume A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1738), Book 1, Part 4, Section 2.
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We must imagine – Paul is rendered helpless, blind, and effectively without sensory 
stimulus. We are told that he neither ate nor drank during this traumatic period. 
When he finally comes back to ‘himself ’, so to speak, he was no longer himself. He 
had become his enemy. Paul became the rock upon which the Christian Church was 
founded, declaring that henceforth there was neither Greek nor Jew, and asserting 
that circumcision of the flesh should cease in favour of circumcision in the soul.
 By the mid 1930s, Paul Wittgenstein had become a one-armed pianist who could 
no longer move freely through his beloved Vienna because of the signs declaiming 
‘Juden verboten’. At first, he tried to get assurances that the family would, as good as-
similated citizens, be treated as Aryans; Paul was astonished to discover that this was 
not the case. ‘We count as Jews!’ was his cry, on reading the Nazi legislation on gene-
alogy and race.31 He then antagonised several family members by trying to negotiate 
with the Nazis, and offering to pay for the family’s status to be ‘reassigned’. 
 Paul ultimately fled to New York at the start of the Anschluss in 1938. Decades 
later, one of his former students, Erna Otten, wrote to neurologist Oliver Sacks about 
her youthful encounter with her piano teacher. We are reminded again of the extraor-
dinary entanglement of mind and flesh through her recollections:
As a very young student of the Viennese pianist Paul Wittgenstein … I had 
many occasions to see how involved his right stump was whenever we went 
over the fingering for a new composition. 
He told me many times that I should trust his choice of fingering because 
he felt every finger of his right hand. At times I had to sit very quietly while 
he would close his eyes and his stump would move constantly in an agitated 
manner. This was many years after the loss of his arm.32 
 It is striking that Paul, from so wealthy a family, did not avail himself of the latest 
technologies in prosthetics development. Photographs show his empty right sleeve 
tucked neatly into the right-hand pocket of his jacket. 
 However, a search for information on Paul Wittgenstein on the internet discloses 
that his legacy lives on in the numerous compositions he commissioned for the one-
handed player. We can effectively consider these works to be Paul’s prosthesis. It is 
worth considering why he seems to have found fault with all the compositions that 
were intended to relaunch his career as a concert pianist. If we acknowledge that a 
prosthesis is a reminder of loss as much as it is a substitution, we might ask, are the 
compositions too obviously or not sufficiently evidently, created for the one-handed 
player? Paul certainly strove to be a piano player, rather than a one-handed pianist. 
There is a vexing ambiguity implicit in this. Each composition must fail because it 
could not return the missing arm. No matter how deft the composition, it would 
31 Monk, Duty of Genius, 396.
32 See O. Sacks, ‘Phantom Limbs: Erna Otten, Reply by Oliver Sacks,’ New York Review of Books, 30 January 1992.
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fail to repair an irrecoverable loss. Was Paul trying to locate a composition through 
which he might ‘pass’ for a two-handed pianist?
As we know, Freud’s meditations in Beyond the Pleasure Principle prompted a series 
of subsequent considerations on the phantasmic, the symptom, and trauma. Recent 
research involving ‘mirror neurons’ demonstrates that the mind can be persuaded 
of what it does not want to know. In some cases, individuals who experience persis-
tent pain in a phantom limb (a limb lost in some kind of catastrophic event) can be 
meaningfully treated if they view their remaining limb in a mirror, and see it respond 
to treatment as if it were the phantom one. For example, seeing the remaining hand 
relaxing can fool the mind into unclenching a phantom fist that has been frozen in a 
rictus for several years. Enigmatically, the brain can relearn what it knows to be true. 
The same research suggests that mirror neurons in the premotor complex might also 
be responsible for empathy. Thus, when I observe a behaviour, I can form a mental 
picture of that behaviour in my mind, and place myself in the position of the other.33 
An interesting set of considerations has come to my attention through studying left-
handed concerto compositions. Many of the pianists who play such compositions are 
two-handed. They undertake the performances as virtuosic displays and expressive 
interpretations. A few perform Godowsky’s left-handed Studies on Chopin’s Etudes as 
part of their standard repertoire – demonstrating left-handed dexterity, a left-hand-
ed (or sinister) right-handedness. Another group of pianists who engage with these 
compositions have both hands but are functionally left-handed. They are afflicted 
with focal dystonia, a neurological condition caused by the ‘misfiring’ of neurons in 
the sensorimotor cortex, the layer of neural tissue covering the brain. In such cases, 
prolonged use of the left hand in and practice and performance creates a distorted 
‘map’ of the hand in the brain. 
 How do these emerging neurological models of the mind, with their metaphori-
cal ‘maps’ of the hand in the sensorimotor cortex, take us back to the dualistic riddles 
of early modernity? What is the hand at the end of my arm, and how does it relate to 
the hand in my mind? 34
IV:  Certain uncertainty
You will recall that Ludwig’s brother, Kurt, killed himself while serving as an offi-
cer in the war, and that he was the third of the three older Wittgenstein brothers to 
do so. Hans (the musical prodigy) and Rudi, had preceded their sibling in acts of 
self-extinction. In 1902, Hans fled to America and seems to have drowned himself 
33 See the interview with neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran, ‘Do Mirror Neurons Give Us Empathy?’ Greater Good Magazine, 29 
March 29, 2012, https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/do_mirror_neurons_give_empathy (accessed 26 June 2018).
34 Mark Hallet, ‘Neurophysiology of Dystonia: The Role of Inhibition,’ Neurobiology of Disease 42, 2, 2011, 177–184. The dystonia, 
it is assumed, arises from a combination of genetic factors as well as environmental modifiers. As Hallet notes, ‘Task specificity 
is a fascinating clinical problem, but its physiology is not well known’ (p. 177). It is, in his description, frequently associated with 
a highly developed repetitive action.
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in Chesapeake Bay. Two years later, Rudi walked into his favourite bar in Vienna, 
ordered a glass of milk, laced it with cyanide and swallowed it. In the days leading 
up to this, he reportedly sought help from the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, 
led by Dr Magnus Hirschfeld, which was campaigning against Paragraph 175 of the 
German Criminal Code, which prohibited homosexual sex. It seems Rudi was terri-
fied that he might be identifiable, and therefore inadvertently exposed, as a subject of 
Hirschfeld’s research. After Rudi’s death, his father forbade the family to ever men-
tion his name.
 These events were observed by, and became part of Ludwig, the youngest of the 
children, heir to his share of the family fortune, and to his share of the family curse. 
No wonder he renounced his inheritance. The whole grim saga has the brooding 
sense of the inevitable that we know from Greek dramatic form. 
 Ludwig had observed the suicide of three brothers, each of whom would in turn 
have been a lost continent in the familial atlas; he observed too, the reparations on- 
going in his brother Paul, the pianist who lost his right arm. When I read On Certainty, 
I am struck by some of the melancholy speculations about the unverifiability of ob-
served events; it is haunted work. For example: 
§90. ‘I know’ has a primitive meaning similar to and related to ‘I see’ (‘wis-
sen’, ‘videre’). And ‘I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room’ 
is like ‘I saw him in the room, but he wasn’t there.’ ‘I know’ is supposed 
to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like  
‘I believe’) but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my con-
sciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes 
on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain 
of what are called sense-data.)
In a notebook from 1917, Wittgenstein writes of Dostoyevsky: ‘If suicide is allowed, 
then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed, then suicide is not allowed.’ 
This from a man who has seen three of his four brothers perish at their own hands. 
Badiou considers this as an instance of Wittgensteinian ‘confessional writing’.35 
I think of it as a kind of ‘catastrophic writing’, grounded in autobiographical fact yet 
also working to shift philosophical thought. 
 In my final observations I would like to return briefly to the idea of ‘passing’ 
which I referred to in relation to the converso, and Paul’s lost arm. 
In ‘On Certainty’ Wittgenstein notes:
§79. That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I 
was a woman, and then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn’t checked 
the statement, the explanation would not be accepted.
35 Badiou, Wittgenstein’s Anti-Philosophy, 87.
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These rather enigmatic meditations call to mind the Turing Test, in which Alan 
Turing, the British mathematical genius responsible for breaking the codes created 
by the Nazi Enigma machine, sought a way of identifying human from artificial intel-
ligence. He posits a version of the Imitation Game, an old parlour game in which a 
man (player A) and a woman (player B) are positioned in separate rooms, each with 
a typewriter. In the original version, they are asked a series of questions, and both 
try to convince their audience that each is the other. In Turing’s version, player A is 
a machine, and the interrogator has to work out which player is the machine. The 
paper was published in Mind in 1950.
 In 1939, Turing had attended Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. From the archive of these events,36 the two men disagreed on a fun-
damental question. Wittgenstein was in favour of tolerating contradiction within 
mathematics; Turing argued against it, positing that the toleration of a contradiction 
would, in application, lead to the collapse of bridges. 
 Turing died of cyanide poisoning in 1954; in 1952, he had been convicted of acts 
of gross indecency and sodomy.
 The human subject has always testified to the arbitrary character of loss. Our 
geniuses give complex accounts of our grief and our resilience in the face of frailty 
and mortality. Wittgenstein’s essay On Certainty can be interpreted as the twentieth 
century’s philosophical ‘coming to terms’ with a necessary and sustaining suspen-
sion of disbelief that grounds the everyday, despite our ever-increasing sense of our 
own precarity.
36 Available via the British Wittgenstein Society at https://www.britishwittgensteinsociety.org.
